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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. ] 
ROBERTO LOPEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
Case No.: 960153-CA 
* Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of 
Stalking, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) whereby the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over appeals from the district court for a 
conviction in a criminal case other than for a first degree or 
capital felony. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Provided in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Point I. Whether Utah's Stalking statute is overbroad on 
its face as well as it is applied to Mr. Lopez' case and 
therefore unconstitutional under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusion that a 
statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) . 
Point II. Whether Utah's Stalking statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusion that a 
statute is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 1995, Roberto Lopez (hereinafter "Mr. 
Lopez") was charged by second amended criminal information with 
Stalking, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-106.5. R. 30. Mr. Lopez filed a motion to dismiss and 
supporting memoranda based on the grounds that the Stalking 
statute was unconstitutional for overbreadth and vagueness on its 
face and as applied under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. R. 31-116, 206-255. A hearing was held before 
the trial court on October 17, 1995 and the trial court took the 
motion under advisement. Transcript of Motion Hearing, R. 644-
66. The trial court denied the motion as it applied to Mr. 
Lopez' facial attack on the statute and reserved the right to 
rule on the motion as it applied to the specific facts which 
would be brought out at trial. R. 256-57. During trial, after 
the State's case was presented, the trial court also denied Mr. 
Lopez' motion as it applied to the facts of the case. Transcript 
of trial, R. 529. 
Following the trial, Mr. Lopez was found guilty of Stalking 
by the jury and was sentenced. R. 358-59, 623, 637. The court 
imposed six months jail, all of which was suspended and eighteen 
months of court probation. The court also fined Mr. Lopez $1850 
and ordered an evaluation for counseling. R. 360. Mr. Lopez 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. 362-63. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City's evidence at trial established five different 
instances of contact between Mr. Lopez and Maria Mota from which 
the jury had to chose from in deciding whether there was a course 
of conduct. 
1. New Years Eve Party, December 31, 1993: Mr. Lopez went 
to a Hispanic community New Years Eve party also attended by 
Maria Mota. He walked up to Ms. Mota, made a hand gesture 
described as his right fist striking his left open hand and 
stating that he loved Ms. Mota. Trial Transcript, R. 386. Mr. 
Lopez then left. R. 387, 404, 477-78. 
2. May, 1994 vehicle incident; Ms. Mota testified that as 
she was traveling in a vehicle, Mr. Lopez, driving another 
vehicle, followed her and "[h]e like sped up, he like drove 
really fast by the side of my car . . . he just tried to get in 
front of me, trying to see if I would hit his car." R. 389. Mr. 
Lopez then drove off. R. 391. 
3. May, 1994, High School: Mr. Lopez walked up to Ms. 
Mota and her friend at Ms. Mota's High School and stated that he 
wanted to talk to Ms. Mota. Ms. Mota told Mr. Lopez that she did 
not want to talk to him and she entered the school. Mr. Lopez 
did not follow Ms. Mota and she did not see him again that day. 
R. 392, 431. 
4. June, 1994, Graduation: Mr. Lopez attended the High 
School graduation ceremony at which Ms. Mota was graduating. Ms. 
Mota saw Mr. Lopez looking at her. R. 393, 438, 445-46. 
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5. June 22, 1994, Sears: Mr. Lopez approached Ms. Mota at 
her place of employment at Sears on Eighth South and State 
Street. Mr. Lopez stated "you better talk to me." Ms. Mota ran 
up the escalator and Mr. Lopez left. R. 394-95. 
Ms. Mota testified to the following regarding the effect 
that the continued contact with Mr. Lopez had on her. Ms. Mota 
testified that she repeatedly told Mr. Lopez that she did not 
want any contact with him. R. 395. Ms. Mota also testified 
regarding the affect of the continuing contact with Mr. Lopez: "I 
just have had nightmares of the things that he's said and done to 
me and things that he's .. could do to me. I feel that I was 
never a teenager, I was unable to join any of the school 
activities." R. 398. Ms. Mota also testified generally about 
being afraid of Mr. Lopez. R. 3 99, 423. Ms. Mota also saw a 
school counselor regarding her fear of Mr. Lopez. R. 415, 425. 
Ms. Mota was nineteen turning twenty during this period of time 
in 1994. R. 416. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Stalking statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 is 
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and as applied to Mr. 
Lopez' case. Both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution recognize a constitutional right to the freedom of 
association and the freedom of movement. Kolender v. Lawson. 461 
U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972); Utah Constitution, Article I, sections 1 
and 15. The Utah Stalking Statute prohibits a substantial amount 
4 
of protected conduct and is not narrowly tailored to meet the 
governmental interest of prohibiting "stalking" types of acts. 
The statute is therefore facially overbroad. Additionally, the 
statute is overbroad as applied to the facts brought out during 
Mr. Lopez' trial. 
Furthermore, the statute does not define the phrase 
"emotional distress," and is therefore unconstitutionally vague. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS 
FACE UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Introduction 
A person is guilty of Stalking in Utah if that person: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause 
a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to 
himself or a member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of 
bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a 
member of his immediate family will suffer 
emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of 
bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the 
specific person or a member of his immediate 
family. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2). "Course of conduct" is defined 
as: "repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a 
person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or 
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threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at 
or toward a person." § 76-5-106.5(1)(a). "Repeatedly" is 
defined as "two or more occasions." § 76-5-106.5(1) (c) . 
As noted by Robert P. Faulkner and Douglas H. Hsiao in their 
article appearing in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, the 
difficulty in adopting stalking statutes is: "how can legislators 
draft a statute that criminalizes 'stalking,' a concept not 
susceptible to precise definition, without trampling on 
constitutional values?" Faulkner and Hsiao, And Where You Go 
I'll Follow; The Constitutionality of Antistalking Laws and 
Proposed Model Legislation, 31 Harv. J. Leg. 1, 3 (1994) 
(hereinafter, referred to as "Faulkner").x As the discussion 
below points out, Utah's statute fails this test by "sweeping and 
indefinite legislation that criminalizes conduct protected by the 
[state and federal] constitutions," and it "vests too much 
discretion in police officers to enforce vague criteria." 
Faulkner at 2.2 
B. Utah's Stalking Statute is Unconstitutional as it is 
Facially Overbroad 
A defendant may challenge the facial validity of a criminal 
1
 Faulkner concluded that "existing antistalking legislation 
[in forty-three states including Utah] is facially 
unconstitutional, with the possible exception of the laws in 
Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland, New Mexico, and North Carolina. Id. 
at 4, 15. Other than those four exceptions, the statutes and 
ordinances in these states "sweep too broadly, suffer from acute 
cases of vagueness, and/or employ content-based distinctions based 
on the perceived 'message' of the stalker." Id. at p. 15. 
2
 This Court has addressed the constitutionality of Utah's 
Stalking statute in an unpublished Memorandum Decision. State v. 
Lifang, Case No.940717-CA (Utah App. filed December 7, 1995). 
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statute for overbreadth even assuming as well as challenging the 
application of the statute to the facts of the defendant's case. 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). The Broadrick 
Court required that where conduct and not merely speech was 
involved, then the "overbreadth of the statute must not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the 
statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. Therefore, a 
court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches 
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494 (1982); Logan Citv v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 
1990). "If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail 
and [the court] should then examine the vagueness challenge." Id. 
A statute "may be held facially invalid even if it also has 
legitimate application." Id. 
Analyzing Utah's Stalking statute, the constitutional 
infirmity is found in the way the statute allows minimal and 
protected conduct of physical or visual proximity to be 
proscribed. The use of the conjunctive "or" in the definition of 
"course of conduct" allows that on two or more occasions, the 
defendant simply "maintain[ed] a visual or physical proximity" 
without any conveyance of threat whatsoever. The use of "or" in 
subsection 2(a), (b) and (c) provides that such visual or 
physical proximities become stalking if the actor intended to or 
should have known that the conduct would cause a reasonable 
person emotional distress, and that the conduct actually created 
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emotional distress. 
The protected conduct infringed upon by Utah's stalking 
statute is the right to associate and move about freely in 
public. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized a 
constitutional right of freedom of movement under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Kolender v. Lavrson. 461 U.S. 352, 358 
(1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-
64 (1972); Stotland v. Pennsylvania, 398 U.S. 916, 26 L.Ed.2d 83, 
85 (1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting from per curiam dismissal) 
(recognizing "one's constitutional right to freedom of movement 
which of course is essential to the exercise of First Amendment 
rights."). 
In addition to the protection of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, this Court should 
rule that Utah's Constitution, Article I, sections 1 and 15, 
protect a person's constitutional rights of association and 
freedom of movement. While Article I, section 15 contains 
similar language to the First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech and press, section 1 has additional language not contained 
in the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people to 
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, section 15 states: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
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freedom of speech or of the press. 
(Emphasis added). Article I, section 1 states: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right. 
(Emphasis added). Both portions of the Utah Constitution 
highlighted suggest a broader protection than provided by the 
federal counterpart. This Court should therefore find that the 
Utah Constitution provides a substantial constitutional right to 
the freedom of association and movement. 
By prohibiting a person's freedom of association and 
movement limited only by the intent or knowledge that it would 
cause a reasonable person emotional distress, Utah's legislature 
has infringed upon that right in not only a real, but a 
substantial way. Indeed, with no definition of "emotional 
distress", it is difficult to imagine how the Legislature could 
have conceived of and adopted a more restrictive statute. 
The different examples of constitutionally protected conduct 
proscribed by the language of Utah's statute are endless. For 
example, a defendant is in the middle of a heated divorce and 
custody battle with defendant's spouse. The defendant knows that 
because of the history and breakdown of the marriage that the 
spouse becomes so distressed at the sight of defendant that the 
spouse has a physical response to the emotion and becomes ill. 
However, the defendant has visitation rights and inevitably and 
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knowingly is in the presence of the spouse whenever picking up 
the children. Under Utah's statute, the defendant's repeated 
actions of picking the children may come under the prohibition of 
the statute. 
Any number of different scenarios could come from two people 
that were involved in a relationship that ended so terribly that 
to ever see each other would certainly cause both significant 
distress. Both have mutual friends and acquaintances that 
require both to attend social functions where the other will 
certainly be. The action of going to the social event knowing 
the other will be there and suffer "emotional distress" would 
arguably be Stalking if it happened twice. 
Another example of protected conduct is where an accused 
must appear in court and face the victim of some violent crime. 
A person is accused of a crime, for example a violent robbery. 
The accused, standing innocent in the eyes of the court before 
trial, appears for court appearances regularly, knowing that the 
victim, who was violently assaulted, believes the accused 
committed the crime. Every time the accused appears at court, 
the victim is waiting outside the courthouse. The accused 
approaches the courthouse and the victim, seeing the accused, 
becomes overwhelmed, ill and faints. Regardless of whether the 
accused was the actual assailant, the victim could very well 
suffer emotional distress under any definition, and the accused 
would have knowledge that the emotional distress would occur. As 
ridiculous as this example sounds, it would qualify as stalking 
10 
under the Utah Statute. 
This last example identifies the foremost problem with the 
Utah Statute. That is, the accused person in a stalking case 
need not have committed any act, such as a threat, prior to the 
physical or visual proximity of another. In other words, all 
that is required is that the accused know that for some reason, 
the complainant suffers some emotional distress, however slight, 
at the visual or physical proximity of the accused. It could be 
based upon a mistaken identity of the accused as the person who, 
in the recent past, did some terrible or not so terrible thing to 
the complainant. Even if the accused actually did nothing in the 
past, if the accused knows of the complainant's mistaken belief, 
then the accused also knows that the complainant will suffer 
emotional distress whenever they are within visual or physical 
proximity of each other. 
A review of the stalking statutes of other states further 
highlights the examples above. The stalking statutes in Alabama, 
California and Florida all have three major components. First, 
the offense must be committed intentionally. Second, and more 
important here, all three states require that there be a 
"credible threat." State v. Randall, 669 So.2d 223, 226 (Ala Cr. 
App. 1995) (comparing the similarities of stalking statutes in 
Alabama, California and Florida). Third, "there must be an 'act' 
of repeatedly following or harassing another person that places 
that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm." 
Id. The Utah statute has none of these limiting factors which 
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other states have addressed when defending challenges of 
overbreadth and vagueness. Under Alabama, California and Florida 
law, none of the above examples of protected conduct would be 
considered stalking. 
C. The Utah Stalking Statute Is Not Narrowly Tailored To 
Serve A Compelling Interest 
Because Utah's stalking statute threatens protected conduct 
in a real and substantial way, it must serve a compelling state 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest if 
the law has any tendency to restrict First Amendment rights. 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 112 S.Ct. 
501, 509 (1991) . Though the State of Utah certainly has a 
legitimate interest in prohibiting "stalking" type of conduct 
which threatens and harasses people, as noted above, the Utah 
statute is far from narrowly tailored to serve that state 
interest. Instead, Utah went far beyond the model statutes that 
existed such as in California and Florida and proscribed all 
physical and visual proximity limited only by the emotional 
distress language. As the Utah Statute is not narrowly tailored, 
it should be determined to be unconstitutional as overbroad on 
its face. 
D- Utah's Stalking Statute Is Unconstitutional As Applied 
to Mr. Lopez7 Case 
The testimony at trial did not evidence any type of verbal 
or written threat made by Mr. Lopez. Indeed, Ms. Mota testified 
that on two occasions, Mr. Lopez stated that he loved her. Under 
the statute, however, the jury needed only to have found that Mr. 
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Lopez was intentionally or knowingly in the physical or visual 
proximity of Ms. Mota and that such proximity: (1) would cause a 
reasonable person emotional distress; (2) that Mr. Lopez had 
knowledge or should have known that Ms. Mota would suffer 
emotional distress; and (3) that Ms. Mota did suffer emotional 
distress based upon the proximity. 
As discussed above, Mr. Lopez has a constitutional right of 
association and freedom of movement under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well 
as Article I, sections 1 and 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
Without finding any threat or conduct constituting a threat, the 
jury could have found that any two of Mr. Lopez' brief encounters 
constituted a course of conduct. The jury therefore could have 
found Mr. Lopez guilty based upon conduct which is 
constitutionally protected and the statute is therefore 
unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of Mr. Lopez' 
case. 
II. THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE FAILS TO DEFINE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE 
The vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define an 
"offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does 
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. 
Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 819); see also, Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983)(holding unconstitutionally vague a 
statute requiring a person to provide "credible and reliable" 
13 
identification when requested by a police officer). "It is a 
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 , 927 (Utah App. 1991) (citation 
omitted). Courts insist "that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
so that he may act accordingly." Gravned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Statutes which are alleged to prohibit 
First Amendment type speech and conduct may also be facially 
challenged for vagueness. Mavnard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 
361 (1988). 
As discussed above, Utah's statute prohibits a course of 
conduct with the only limiting factor being defined by the phrase 
"emotional distress." However, the phrase "emotional distress" 
is not defined in the statute. The Faulkner article discusses 
other state courts which have found that the failure to define 
the same phrase was unconstitutional. Faulkner at 25. In 
Commonwealth v. Camper, No. 93-2876 (Va. Gen. Dist. Ct. Apr. 9, 
1993), a Virginia trial court struck down that state's anti-
stalking statute partly on vagueness grounds where the statute 
required that a stalking perpetrator must "engage in conduct" 
with an "intent to cause emotional distress." Faulkner at 24. 
These phrases were too ill-defined to put the public and the 
police on notice as to what conduct is and is not proscribed. 
Similarly, in United States v. Smith. No. M-6400-93 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1993), the District of Columbia Superior 
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Court invalidated a stalking ordinance partly on vagueness 
grounds because the statute: 
fails to define terms such as "emotional 
distress" and "harassing" with particularity 
even though such terms are essential to 
understanding what conduct the statute makes 
criminal. Under this version of the statute, 
law enforcement personnel are left to their 
own subjective interpretations as to what 
constitutes "emotional distress" or 
"harassing." What may constitute emotional 
distress or harassment to one person may be 
different to another person and could depend 
on the tolerance level of the persons 
enforcing the statute or the person to which 
such conduct is directed. 
Faulkner at 25. 
The phrase "emotional distress" is not one which has some 
common understanding in the general public. It is interesting 
that the term "repeatedly" is specifically defined, yet a concept 
such as "emotional distress" which is more a legal term of art 
than a concept with any specific definition is left to the 
state's and ultimately the jury's discretion as to what meaning 
to apply. Because the concept of emotional distress is vague, no 
person can know with any degree of certainty whether a reasonable 
person might suffer from it from the accused's visual or physical 
proximity. Since emotional distress is such a key part of Utah's 
Stalking statute, there is no way to correct the problem without 
a statutory definition and the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face. 
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REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION 
This case raises issues of first impression in Utah. No 
prior published opinion in this State has addressed the 
constitutionality of Utah's Stalking statute. Because of the 
frequency with which the Stalking statute is being applied, these 
issues have far reaching consequences for other defendants. 
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument and a published 
decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, Lopez respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction for Stalking on 
the basis that Utah's Stalking statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad both facially and as applied under the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Additionally, Lopez 
requests that this Court find the Utah Stalking statute 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
DATED this ^ h; day of September, 1996 
cJDKtflD VrTlNLAYSON 
At torney for Appe l l an t 
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ADDENDUM A 
CITY/STATE 
Third Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT FORM 
Criminal/Traffic 
Plaintiff, Case Number 
Tape Number 
Date 
qLirmmznp 
Nu ber _ C# 
Time 
Defendant 
Judge/ 
Clerk 
DOB:. 
/Qqmm ^ 
in Counsel. 
VSZJAJHPJ 
Interpreter , 
CHARGES / Q f o f . piptir M 
Plaintiff el 
Defense Counsel 
Amended 
Amended 
IL 
crfr!A(J(u pny) 
THE COURT SENTENj 
(1) Jail 
r CED THE DEFEND 
motojup 
ANT AS FOLLOWS: 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence. 
(2)FineAmt. $ ^O^AJ Susp. $. 
Suspend MQ. 
Fee $ 
QjmOMjM 
Fine Bal $ ferrr 
Payment Schedule: Pay 
(3) Court Costs $ 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ KTT-
3D per month/ 1st Pmt. Due Jy^O^L(2 Last Pmt. DueT lV V ^ W 
(4) Community Service/WP 
(5) Restitution $ 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) 
(7) 
through 
Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court 
Probation Jf$ H^^ffj^ fcf&ood Behavior QAP&P DACEC D Other 
JS Counseling thru 
U Classes 
s of Probation: 
No Further Violations 
fAA Meetings. ./wk ./month 
• Follow Program 
(J No Alcohol 
QAntibuse ^ * ^ ^ 
|Employment / f f T f f i f f l J i ^ . 
I Proof < 
D In/Out Treatment 
• Health Testing 
• Crime 
too. 
3-50^ 
of 
U i Lab Procedure , * 
(8) Plea in Abeyance/ Diversion 
(9) Review /_ / at 
u flAVlit U y . A 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third Circuit 
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT 
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ADDENDUM B 
SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
451 South 200 East, #125-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 535-7767 
rlLcU / 
S3 JAi! 12 py3:08 
o » 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
•s . / 
ROBERTO LOPEZ, / 
Defendant. / 
01 
/ 1/ 
/ 
tDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 941008952 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Based on legal arguments of counsel, memoranda, and supporting material filed by the 
parties, the court finds that Utah's anti-stalking law, §76-5-106.5, Utah Code Ann., is not 
unconstitutional on its face. The court reserves for trial the issue of whether the law is 
/ 
unconstitutional as applied in defendant's case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Hoi/ Robert K. Hilder 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
DATED this /J' day of January, 1996. 
Submitted by: 
Vifginia Ward ^ S ^ * ' ^ 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
Approved as to form: 
Davki^shlayson 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED/DELIVERED the order denying defendant's motion to dismiss, this 
day of January, 1996, to the following: 
David Finlayson 
Attorney for Defendant 
454 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM C 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress snail make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Section 1. [Citizenship —Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized m the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abndge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint* 
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives m Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is demed to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or m any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age m such State. 
Sec, S. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative m Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
evil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
*ny State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
•hall have engaged m insurrection or rebellion against the 
aame, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
•wch disability 
See 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
nzad by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services m suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion agamst the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void 
S e c 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con* 
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right ISM 
S e c 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press —LlbeL] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact ust 
76-5-106.5. Definition* — Crime of stalking. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) 'Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining 
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly 
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, 
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household 
within the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself u in 
member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury 
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of 
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress; 
and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of ''bodily 
injury to himself cur a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person 
or a member of his immediate family. 
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) (a) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the offender: 
(i) has been previously convicted of an offense of 
stalking; 
(ii) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an 
offense that is substantially similar to the offense of 
stalking; or 
(iii) has been previously convicted of any felony 
offense in Utah or of any crime in another jurisdiction 
which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in 
which the victim of the stalking or a member of the 
victim's immediate family was also a victim of the 
previous felony offense. 
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as denned in Section 
76-1-601 under drcvmatancea not amounting to a viola-
tion of Subsection 76-5-103(lXa), or used other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in 
the commission of the crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of 
the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another 
jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses that are substan-
tially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any 
combination, of offenses under Subsections (5Xb) and (c); 
or 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of 
felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction 
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be 
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a 
victim of the previous felony offenses. lift 
